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ISSUES
ISSUE 1
Was Appellants' Claim Properly Dismissed By Summary Judgment For Failure To Exhaust The ISCI
Grievance Process, And Were Appellants Entitled To A Trial By Jury?
ISSUE 2
Were Appellants Constitutional Due Process Rights Violated?
ISSUE 3
Do Appellants Have A Legitimate Claim For Harassment And Retaliation?
ISSUE 4
Did The Defendants Actions Violate Double Jeopardy, Collateral Estoppel Rule? And Should The
District Court Have Made A Ruling On This Issue?
ISSUE 5
Are Defedants Entiled To Qualified Immunuty?
ISSUE 6
Did District Court Abuse Its Discretion By Dismissal Of Defendant Reinke?
ISSUE 7
Are Defendants Entitled To Attorneys Fees?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE;
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal From the district courts Order granting Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment.
William Lightner (WL) is an Appellant currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC).
Appellant Marcia Lightner (ML) is his wife. Appellants filed this action pursuant to 43 USC 1983, claiming
that their constitutional rights were violated when Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) officials
repeatedly suspended ML's visiting privileges. Appellants fiuthcr claim that IDOC policy and procedures
(P&P) are vague and unconstitutional.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
WL is legally married to ML (R., p. 33, @lo). He is currently incarcerated under IDOC control, and
has been at all times relevant to this action. (R., p 32). On 10 April 07 ML was arrested under 1C 18-205 (R.,
P 33 @ 11) and accepted a plea agreement for a misdemeanor and probation. As a result of ML's arrest her
visiting privileges were terminated on 12 April 07 (R., p 33 @ 12), and reinstated by warden Blades in July 07
(R., Ex. 4. p. 3 @ 7), after missing 41 visits.
In August 2007 respondent Hardison replaced Blades as warden, and on 1 October 07 Suspended
ML's visiting privileges, a second time, for the same 10 April 07 arrest. (R., Ex. 4. p. 4 @ 8). Appellants
began the appeals process but were blocked, when warden Hardison bypassed steps one and two, answering
the initial concern from the position of Appellate Authority and created an estoppel. (R., p. 70).
Appellants filed a Civil Rights complaint (R., p. 7) and Amended it on 16 Jan 08 (R., p. 31).
Respondents responded to both (R., p 21) and (R., p. 44) before tiling a Motion for Summary Judgment on 21
Nov. 08 (R., p 5). Appellants responded to Motion for Summary Judgment (R., p 54) and a hearing was held
on 22 Dec. 08 (Tr., pp 32-78) which resulted in the district court granting Defendants motion for summary
Judgment. Appellants filcd a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied (12 Feb 09 and 13 March 09),
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'

and filed a Notice of appeal on 11 March 09 (R., p. 84).

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1
WAS APPELLANTS' CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED BY SUMMARY .JUDGMENT FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST THE ISCl GREIVANCE PROCESS? AND WERE APPELLANTS
ENTITLED TO A TFUAL BY JURY?
A.

INTRODUCTION

This claim is atypical in nature as to the fulfillment of the PLRA requirements as far as most inmate claims
filed are concerned. The grievance system is designed so that the person of least responsibility and closest to
the incident of concern is assigned the first step of the process. If a resolution camot be obtained which
satisfies the inmate's issue, a fonnal grievance may be filed to aWReviewingAuthority" as the second step. If
still unsatisfied with the reply, the inmate may take a third step and appeal the decision to the Warden as the
institutions facility head, and final "Appellant Authority"
What makes this claim atypical is that it was warden Hardison himself acting as the "final Appellate
Authority" that answered and responded to the initial concern. (R., 70) The IDOC Directives list the steps
necessary for normal proceedings, but they give absolutely no direction in grievance procedures when the
facility head, acting as the final authority, answers the initial concern.

B.

ARGUMENT
Pursuant to the prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) ''[nlo action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42

U.S.C. $ 1997 e (a).
The IDOC has a grievance procedure, which falls under the PLRA requirements and is contained in
P&P Directive 3 16. In most instances this procedure consists of a three-step process, "Thnlprocess requires
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/he offender to (I) seek an informal resolution qf the mailer by completing an offender concern form; (2)
complete a grievance form if informal resolution can not be accomplished; and.finally (3) an appeal of the
response to the grievance. " (R., Ex 2, p. 3. #4).
Because in this instance the PLRA process was atypical, the P&P Directive 316 is unconstitutionally
vague and does not give a clear path to follow, 04.00.00. Definitions list thc Reviewing Authority as the
Deputy Warden and the Facility Head as the Warden. The Directive states at 05.02.01 that," An ofender shall

try to solve his issue or problem informully by using a concern form before filing a grievance." 05.02.02
continues the PLRA requirements by explaining the second step. It states in relative part that "The offender

must state the action that the offender believes the reviewing authority [depu@warden, by deJinition] should
fake ...the grievance shall be assigned to the most applicable slag but not fhe same stafwho responded to the
concern. "
In this occasion, the warden, acting as "Appellate Authority" answered the initial concern form (R.,

70). This leaves no room for the offender to file a grievance as to the second step, or an appeal as the third
step, because it had already been responded to by the "Appellate Authority".

It waq the warden who

circumvented the procedure. In Defendant's Response brief they quote a Sttpreme Court decision that "The

benefit fo exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportuniiy to
consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not huve such an opportunity unless the grieved
complies with the systems crilical procedural rules." Woodford v. Neo, 548 U.S. at 95 (2006) (p.6). It
should therefore be pointed out, that it was the Warden answering the initial concern form, not as Warden, but
as the final "Appellate Authority" (R., 70) who voided and bypassed the grievance procedure.
On pg. 8, of Respondents Brief they summarize the Directive 316 grievance policy. Following this
summary of the second step they write, "gthe inmate is unsatisfied with the reviewing authority's decision, he

may proceed to the third step by filing a grievance appeal. The grievance appeal is logged and forwarded to
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the ap~ellateaurhorifv, usually the warden,for rhejnal decision. "
There is nothing in [DOC Directive 316 that prohibits an offender from grieving a warden's decision.
In fact, the Directive states at 02.01.001 that grievance coordinator will file the grievance with the "most

applicable stax hut not the same staff who responded to the concern. " This is where Directive 3 16 becomes
vague.
When answering the initial concern form, the Warden did not just answer it as the Warden. Instead, he
answered it as the "Appellate Authority" and by passed Appellant's grievance opportunity. (R., 70) Directive
3 16 lists the "Appellate Authority as the final step. Appellants claim that it was the Warden who violated the
steps of Directive 316 when he answered the concern form as if it were the third (31d) step of the procedure.
When he answered as the "Appellate Authority" he completed PLRA requirements.
Furthermore, this was confirmed to Appellant (WL), when unit correctional officers (CO's) told him
he could "Not" grieve the issue (R., Ex. 5, pg. 3, #12-13, 17). Being told by unit CO's that the grievance
process was completed when Appellants attempted to confirm this by appealing direct to the director's office.
(R., Ex. 5 pg. 3 # 1T5-16) (R., Ex. 6 pg. 6 # 22-23).
Appellants also note that, ML is neither an employee nor an offender. She therefore is not bound by
the rules established by the PLRA. As an Appellant in the complaint, and not an employee or offender, PLRA
exhaustion rules do not apply, and should not have been considered for summary judgment. Directive
Number 3 16.02.01.001 (page 2 of 7) further goes on to state:

"Offender- A person under the legal care, custody, supervision or authority
of the Board including a person within or wilhout the state pursuant to
agreement with another state or contractor."
The district court did not attempt to dismiss WL, who is an offender, as an Appellant for failure to
exhaust PLRA requirements. Instead, thc lower court used the PLRA requirement to dismiss the cntire case
by summary judgment in spite of the fact that ML was not bound by PLRA requirements.
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Defendants have also used the case of Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204 (2007) stating that,

"...exhausting the grievance process would have given Warden Hardison the opportuniw to reconsider his
decision (Response briefpage 10).

This contradicts Directive 3 16 at 02.01.001 that; the grievance will not

be answered by "...the Tame staff that responded to the concern." And Warden Hardison was the Appellate
Authority.
When unit CO's told Appellant WL his appeal process was complete, and his concern form was
answered by Appellate Authority, he had an estoppel to further PLRA appeal. Having used the prison
grievance system in the pas!, there is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that Appellant WL knew the
procedure (R., 74-75). When this normal procedure was barred and became atypical in nature, with no
understandable Directive to turn to in this instance, Appellant WL was told by unit CO's he had exhausted his
in-house remedies.

The Booth v. Church, 531 U.S. 956, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1824-25 (2001) Court held that

prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies because of the possibility of relief. Appellants
claim is atypical, in that there was no possibility of relief. No ISCI staff personnel had the power or authority
to override the Wardens decision as Appellate Authority. The Warden cannot, by Directive, review his own
decision, and the Directors office (Jeff Zarnuta) stated that they were not part of the appeal process that the
Wardens decision is final. I-Ie would stand by the warden's decision. Furthermore, because Appellate review
is the final step of the appeal process, and the Warden responded as Appellate Authority (R., 70), the
possibility of relief was non-existent.
In addition, the court denied Defendant's Motion for Dismissal for failure to exhaust remedies
under the PLRA in the case of Davis v. Wochrer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. W1 1999) ruling that the
exhaustion requirements of the PLRA does not apply where the Appellant is pursuing monetary damages, and
the prison grievance system and procedure does not provide for monetary relief. Likewise, Appellants here
have asked for monetary damages for each visit lost. This is not achievable through the prison grievance

I
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system.
It is enough that Appellants claim for monetary damages; arise from alleged violations for denial of
procedural due process in their revocation. Appellants clearly had an established liberty interest in their
visiting privileges which they brought with civil rights action under a 1983 claim Henrv v. Sanchez, 923 F .
Supp 1266 (CD. CA 1996).
Defendants' counsel argues that Appellant WL could appeal Warden Harrison's decision; however,
the lDOC did not provide and does not provide any forins or P&P for inmates to grieve the warden.
Defendant Hardison did not follow the P&P that was written for him to follow based on 604.02.01.001 p.21 of
25, and also argued in : (Tr. p.70 17-25 and Tr. p.71, 1-14), "in terminating the visiting privileges goes
through a step-by-step process of how each step is recorded. When you get to the facility head, it states: (1)

Schedule a meeting with the visitor.

Next s t e ~ ,the facilitv head discusses the reason for the

termination, the aaalicable visiting rules, and ex~ectationsfor visiting conduct. (2) Next s t e ~reads,
The facilitv head reviews the offender's file and institutional behavior. (3) Next stea reads, Faciliq
head makes the decision to continue termination, reinstate with restrictions or without restrictions. (41
Next s t e ~says: The facilitv head sends notice of the decision to the visitor, offender, and visiting room
staff." Warden Hardison skipped all P&P steps that provided Appellant
-

MZ, her

due process right to be heard

by terminating her visiting on the phone followed by a letter of termination. (R., 70)

In the case of Izalt, et al.. K Anderson et al., Civil # 77-1066 (1979) (appealed by visitorpursuant to
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code Sections 67-5201 et seg.), the U.S. District court gave an
Order and Judgment concerning Visiting P&P, and Defendants agreed to adopt the following rules and
regulations set forth before visiting could be terminated.

IDOC was Ordered and required to provide due

process prior to termination of visiting. They accepted the procedure under lzatt to give Due Process. This
case set precedence to visiting P&P and applies to all visiting terminating issues, demanding through the
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Order of how the process has to be handles before visits can be tcrrninated. Even though this case dealt with
strip searches, it also deals with due process of visitation terminations which leaves the IDOC in the position
to not being selective from one part of visiting to the other. They are bound to provide due process, held in
Izalt, and by their own P&P which warden Hardison and IDOC officials ignored. Since due process hearing,

was not afforded to Appellants it cicarly shows a violation had taken place. Therefore, by not following
IDOC P&P or a Court Order that provides due process to Appellants, Defendants have no legal leg to stand
on; no argument as to failure to complete the grievance process; therefore, Defendants should not have denied
visitation or applied punishment before hand. It seems quite bizarre that Appellants are required to follow

P&P, when Defendants have not followed the P&P or Court Order.
AuueManb were Entitled to a Trial by Jurv
Oilc

of the most fundamental rights possessed by Americans is the Constitutional right to a trial by

jury. In filing this complaint, Appellants demanded the trial by jury they were entitled to (R., 42).

In

response, counsel for Defendants also demanded a jury trial (R., 44). As pointed out throughout this appeal,
there are many issues of material fact in dispute. While still in controversy, the court has automatically and
unconstitutionally accepted Defendants debatable statements and reported incidents as fact. They failed to
consider that these "accepted statements" are highly disputed and a major source of the claimed harassment.
Without even considering Appellants claim, the court made its decision without allowing Appellants to
present their side of these events to a jury. The court based their decision solely on Defendants reply brief
(R., 21) and disregarded the trial by jury both parties had demanded.

A trial by jury is requested where evidence could be presented and witnesses could testify, for the jury
to rule on the issues in dispute. Unfortunately, the court has denied Appellants that right. Oddly enough, of
the three (3) issues presented in the 1983 claim, two (2) still remain unanswered or even mentioned in the
courts ruling. For the court to deny the fundamental right to due process and a trial by jury guaranteed by law,
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for the sake of expedience, is showing the same prejudicial treatment toward a member of a disfavored group
that Defendants have shown. Furthermore, by failing to respond to the issues, the district court creates and
estoppel to appeal.
If provided the opportunity to a trial by jury, Appellants could have proven several issues in their case:

1.
2.

3.

4.

That harassment did exist, and several witnesses would have been called to testify to that effect.
ML's clothing was not anything abnormal apposed to any other visitor, and many women and visitors
were reprimanded for their clothing.
Witnesses would have testified for Appellants as to retaliation and harassment from other visiting
CO's;
Witnesses would have testified that other women and girl friends of inmates were or had been felons
on felony parole and allowed to visit, as well as testified that other women worked for the prisons in
Idaho and remain visiting.

Appellants had a Constitutional right to a trial by jury.

ISSUE 2
WERE APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED?
A.

INTRODUCTION
In the District C o w s Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R., 96), the

Court gives its opinion centered solely on the inmate, in this case WL. The court completely ignores that fact
and her rights were the rights violated by Defendant s actions.
that it was ML's visitation that was suspe~~ded
The Court gives various explanations as to why an inmate should not have visits, but ML is not an "inmate ".
The Court also goes on to say, (R., 97): "aperson who haspending criminal charges or who is the suhject of

a criminal investigation will not he allowed to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of the facility
head or designee. "

Warden Blades was a facility head, and did give written permission based on his

dissection. This permission should not have been over-ridden unless a due process hearing was afforded
Appellants. The Court's oversight show an abuse of its discretion by not taking into consideration the liberty
interest that came into effect for Appellants during the second termination of their visits. ML was innocent
until proven guilty of the charge, therefore should have been acknowledged by district court.
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Although visiting may be considered a privilege, the loss of a privilcge is punishment. To be punished
without due process is unconstitutional. Appellants claim that in suspending their visits, Defendants should
have provided them with a due process hearing. Why should the loss of "visiting" privileges be treated as any
less, or any different, than when other infractions cause the loss of privileges to occur, andlor sanctions to be
imposed? Another matter of interest is that not only was a due process hearing not automatically scheduled,
but also when Appellants requested a hearing, the request was denied.
With the suspension of Appellants visits, it must be noted that they were not allowed to challenge any
evidence used against them; they were not allowed to offer evidence in their own behalf; and, they were not
allowed to cross examine adverse testimony against them. The decision was completely arbitrary in nature
and not appealable. Thus the only approach Appellants saw in reestablishing their visits, or even receiving a
hearing, was through the court, hence, the filing of this action.
Although initially not considered by Appellants, another way to obtain visits was possible. WL was
transferred to ICC. It must also be especially recognized that after this transfer Appellants visiting and
consortium privileges were restored. ML visited with her husband each week for an entire year without any
incidents or noted security concerns to the institution. However, when submitting her yearly renewal form, as
s
again without a
all visitors are required to do, ML's visiting privileges were again terminated. T l ~ occurred
hearing, without prior notice, and ordered again due to the same 2007 misdemeanor conviction. Appellants
pointed out through appeal that P&P for misdemeanor offences are different than tl~oseof felony terminations,
regarding the time a person has to wait before they can re-visit.

Consequently, the reason for the denial

changed from her 2007 arrest, to her 1997 employment as a contract vender.

B.

ARGUMENT
It is undisputed that ML was a regular IDOC visitor for over twelve (12) years. Due to events resulting

in a misdemeanor conviction she was denied visits from 12 April 07 to 20 July 07 (R., 151, and denied a due
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process hearing or notice prior to the suspension of her visits. On 20 July 2007 Warden Blades reinstated
ML's visiting privileges, which allowed her to visit her husband WT,. This allowance created a liberty
Interest. Having an established privilege and liberty interest, ML visited her husband twice per week (at cach
scheduled opportunity) throughout the summer. This distinguishes Appellants case as atypical from those
simply applying for visiting approval. Appellants had an established Liberty Interest by visiting on a regular
routine, moreover since warden Blades re-instated visiting created a Liberty Interest, which before visiting
could be suspended; Appellants were due a hearing on the issues or institutional reason for suspension.
The district court quoted Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 1984 when addressing the due process
claim. "The Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution does not of its own force, create a liberty

interest... ",for it is well settled ,hat an inmate does not have a liberly iineresl in ihe denial of contact visits by
a spouse, relatives, children, andfriends. " (R., 96)
However, liberty interest can be created, Kv. Deut. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461

(1989) (R., 96) Had ML been applying for visitation and been denied, no liberty interest would exist. But this
is not the case. Warden Blades had approved ML after his review and consideration of the situation. She was
steadfastly visiting on a normal basis with our incident. When her visits were approved, and she was allowed

N
to routinely visit, a liberty interest was created. (See Giano v. Selske 238 F.3d 223 (zndCir 2001) and&
Camper 647 S.W. 2d 923 (MO. App. 1983)). To revoke the given privilege required due process.
Using Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) the district court ruled (R., 97) that, "...to create a

liberty interest, ihe action taken must be an aty~~ical
and signzjkant deprivationfrom the normal incidents of
prison lSfe. " It is normal for potential visiting requests to be denied. It is also normal for an approved visitor,
or inmate who commits a violation to temporarily lose their privileges. It is very abnormal and atypical for
Appellants visiting to be suspended for fortyone (41) visits, before being reinstated, and then for the same
offense to be suspended again permanently. When the previous warden had suspended, reviewed and
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reinstated Appellants visiting privileges, punishment for that offense was completed. This abnormal and
atypical deprivation from the normal incidents of prison life distinguishes and set this case apart from that of

Sandin. It is clear by the visiting log that a liberty interest had been created. It is also clear and undisputed
that no due process was given prior to suspending Appellants visiting.
Throughout the duration of Appellants visiting history they have been targeted for harassment due to
WL's classificatiori. On numerous occasions falsified documentation was placed in Appellants visiting file.
It is imperative to point out that not once were Appellants given a hearing or chance to rebut this negative
documentation. In fact, the largest majority was placed in the file without their knowledge. These falsified
documents were accepted by the district court as being factual (R., 91 L33).'
In the case of Schwartz v. Jones, 2001 WL 118600 (E.D. LA 2001), the court awarded damages when
the actions of prison defendants did not serve a penalogical interest. Likewise, Appellants here had been
visiting the entire summer without incident. When Defendant Hardison re-suspended Appellants privileges; it
served no legitimate Penalogical interest. Furthermore, privileges were suspended, without prior notice,
hearing, or any other form of due process. Appeliants' requests for a hearing were denied.
DefendantsIRespondents in this ease believe that their decisions are beyond review. A similar belief
~ 2000) there, the court held that "accepting such on
occurred in Sharr, v. Westton, 233 F.3d 1166 ( 9 Cir.

argument [aJer defendants failed to comply with an injunction] would transfer the safguarding of
constitutional rights , f o m the courts to mental health professionuls" was not acceptable.

Similarly,

Defendants here believe they can arbitrarily do as they please. Appellants, in loosing established visiting
privileges were entitled to due process. The loss of a privilege is a punishment, and punishments require due
process
In 2000, the loth Cir. Ruled that a prisoner's due process rights were violated when he was classified

'

At1 IDOC Sgt. has offered to testify if case goes to trial that prejudicial treatment existed toward Appellants from certain visiting
officers, and that negative visiting documents were fictitiously created.
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as a sex offender based on an allegation of rape. Chambers v. Colorado Deit. of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237.
The allegation was not prosecuted. The sex offender classification carried a consequence. The court ruled
that this classification was something of valuc, which entitled him to procedural due process.
Here, the district court's belief in falsified files, created without procedural due process, influenced
their decision and Order (R., 91 L. 22). Not only were these unfounded allegations used against Appellants as
reason to revoke visitation privileges, hut were done so without providing a revocation hearing.
As Defendants apparently now realizes that they have violated Appellants Constitutional rights,
according to

Mendoza v. B l o d m , 960 F.2d 1425, (gthCir. 1993) held, a prisoner has liberty interest in

visiting rights, and visitation can only be suspended under an enumerated list of circumstances, but only after
a finding of guilt pursuant to a regular disciplinary hearing which requires that a written notice be---written
noticc had to be given to inmates and visitor without, opportunity to review. Appellants were never afforded
there due process rights to be heard, to a hearing, or protected Liberty Interest.
In Defendants Brief (pg. 17) states that, because of MVs arrest of harboring a fugitive served a
legitimate purpose of protecting the security of the institution; that Warden Hardison was acting with the
penological purpose to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. However, MVs due
process was violated when she was presumed guilty of this charge before a trial of guilty plea. ML's
conviction was not a felony of Harboring; it was finalized as being a misdemeanor with probation that is
concluded with all fines paid. Defendants have denied Appellants visiting privileges based upon a fear that
ML is a threat to the institution, which is could not have been the reason when Warden Blades reinstated
visiting, and no additional problems occurred from the time Blades reinstated to the time warden Hardison
suspended again.
Appellants are aware of other women that have been approved and had worked for the institutions,
been arrested, or even those on felony parole visiting a co-defendant, a1 of which have been allowed and
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approved to visit. By warden Hardison suspending ML's visiting after warden Blades reinstated them, does
not show a security concern since there had been no security problems after the reinstatement. It does
however show harassing actions again by terminating Appellants visiting after warden Blades reinstatement.
~ppellant'svisitation is still suspended and they have been told indefinitely. This is a harsher sentencing and
punishment than other wives or girlfriends have received, and there is no penological reasoning for this kind
of treatment. ML has not created a security concern for the institutions. Just by being charged with a felony
does not mean that the charges were correct in the action taken. ML was innocent until proven guilty in a
court of law, and was not afforded that right. Even since the completion of her legal issues her visits are still
being denied, and even though she has completed her probation without any further problems, Defendants still
refuse her approval to visit her husband. With WL, having to serve out the remaining five years of his
sentence, it is excessive punishment for Appellants to be separated for five years without seeing each other or
through visitation. It is cruel and unusual punishment to expect a mamed couple to never see each other.
Appellants refer to the courts ruling in, Berch v. Staltl, 373 F. Supp 412 (W.D. NC 1974) The Court
held that interference with communication between inmate and his or her spouse may be unconstitutional as
an infringement of rights of family relationship and privacy attached to activities relating to the family.
Per IDOC visiting P&P 604.02.01.001, it states that visiting privileges can be terminated for five (5)
years if charged with a felony, and if charged with a misdemeanor it is three (3) years. Appellant ML was
charged with a felony, but her case ended with a misdemeanor. Since Defendants have not followed the P&P
or Court Order to provide due process as required to do, Appellants hold that the termination of their visitation
was unconstitutionally applied to their situation, but since even though the three years are not completed in
April 2010, (as to the misdemeanor guidelines) their visiting should now be reinstated. However, Defendants
continue to deny approval and now state it's indefinite.
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ISSUE 3
DO APPELLANTS HAVE A LEGITMATE CLAIM FOR HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION?
A.

INTRODUCTION
In early 1997 ML worked five (5) months for Swansons Corp. and made commissary deliveries to the

various local IDOC prisons as a contract vender (ICC did not exist at that time). Desiring to build a
relationship with WL, ML quit her job at Swanson's commissary in August 1997. Five ( 5 ) months later they
married. Because ML had worked Swanson's as a contract vender at SICI, certain IDOC officials opposed
the marriage, and harassment of the Appellants began.
After Appellants were manied on December 30, 1997 ML applied to visit, and was approved in
January 1998, however after having only one (1) visit she was told they were recalculating her timetable, and
her visits were terminated.
In accordance with [DOC current P&P an ex-employee or contract vender had to wait six (6) months
from their last employment before being allowed to visit a current inmate. Although Appellants had already
waited six (6) months from when she quit her employment, in an atypical decision, ML was told to wait
another six (6) months. IDOC decided to count from the time she applied, rather than from the date of her last
employment as P&P stated. So Appellants did as asked and reapplied in June 1998. She was then approved.
After just three (3) months, ML's visiting privileges were terminated again. The reason this time was
that IDOC had convcniently rewritten the visiting policy stating that: all former conlract vendors with visiting

privileges would be terminated, and could only be approved by the discretion of the warden. Although it was
a new policy and violated expost facto law, it was retroactively applied to ML.
Interestingly, there were several other women who temporarily lost their visiting, however, after
appealing; they "all" were reinstated except for ML. Her visiting privileges were the only one still being
denied. This showed the prejudicial, biased, and disparate treatment that made this an atypical case. It proved
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that the new P&P was written directly targeting Appellants.
Appellants were forced to hire an attorney to represent them concerning this new IDOC P&P. He
arranged for a meeting with himself, ML, and Bonna Miller (IDOC director at the time). The results of that
meeting were that ML would be allowed to visit with no contact for one (1) year. Then, if no problems arose,
regular visits would resume.
When the restricted year was up, instead of receiving normal visits, W1, was instead transferred on 25
July 2000 to the newly built ICC prison. ML put her application in to visit him there and was approved.
However, after only two (2) visits, ISCI warden Klauser contacted ICC and ML's visiting privileges were
again terminated.
ICC officers were very prejudice towards sex offenders, and WL was purposely placed in a unit where
he was assaulted. IIe received a broken hand, a broken eye socket, cuts, and a severe concussion. After this
attack, he was transferred to Orofino on 10 October 2000. Un-hindered by the distance, ML drove close to
200 miles to Orofino every weekend and never missed a visit. Approximately six (6) months affer WL's
transfer, realizing he was going to be kept, their ML also relocated to save on travel time, and expenses.
Although Appellants visits had been restricted a full year, being at a new institution, in another atypical
decision their visits were again restricted for the "initial year".
In July 2001, when IDOC realized ML had permanently moved to Orofino they again transferred WL.
This time, to Bonniville County jail in Idaho Falls. When Appellants fought this new separation, and blatant
harassment they filed 1983 action. WL was returned back to Orofino March 2002 and the^1983 was ruled
moot. Appellants were then allowed to visit until WL's release on parole in January 2004. In 2005 WL
returned to prison on a parole violation of absconding. ML again applied for visits, and was approved. WL's
absconding did not affect her visiting at that time. After close to three (3) months of visiting, serious
harassment toward Appellants had begun. Appellants noted this in various complaints and concern forms to
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IDOC and Warden Blades about the treatment they were receiving. (See Exhibit of conlplaints and DOR's).
From September 2005 until now, Appellants have been subjected to abuse and harassment from IDOC and
ICC Officials with no penological reasoning behind their decisions. Appellants' visiting is always the target.
Any excuse is used to terminate Appellants only treasured time together. By being a member of a disfavored
group, Appellants have been the targets for disparate treatment.

B.

ARGUMENT
Appellants claimed that the termination of their visiting privileges was "aimed directly as a jbrm of

harassment and retaliation" This was filed as claim I1 in both the Appellants original complaint (R., 13) and
in the Amended Complaint (R., 38). Yet neither Defendants/Respondents nor the district court replied to this
claim. In comparing the respondents reply with that of the courts order it is clear Claim I1 has never been
answered. Therefore, this Court must recognize this action was filed as a valid Claim, which holds merit.
Because Defendants failed to answer the claim, the district court should have granted the claim instead of
coping Defendants' Memorandum.

Defendants Redv Memorandum
Statement of Facts
Summary Judgment Standard
Failure to Exhaust
Defendants Reinke and Nelson
Constitutional Rights
Qualified Immunity
Loss of Consortium

(R., 122 Ex 7)
(pg. 2)
(pg. 3)
@ g 4)
(pg. 9)

District Court Order
(R., 71)
Background
(R., 71)
Summary Judgment Standard (R., 73)
Failure to Exhaust
(R., 74)
Director Reinke
(R., 76)
Steve Nelson
(R., 76)
Constitutional Rights
(R., 77)
Qualified Inmunity
(R., 80)
Loss of Consortium
(R., 81)

The record shows (R, 39-40) that WL was continually transferred form facility to facility. Appellants
claim that these transfers were made out of harassment and retaliation to prevent visit between Appellants.
The U.S. Courts have ruled that allegations made by Appellants are taken as true, and the Court must construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to Appellants. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 41 1,421 (1996).
The district court should have accepted Appellants claim as true. Furthermore, because defendants
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failed to even respond to the claim, the district court should have accepted the allegations as true, and granted
the claim by default, or proceed to trial by jury. Worse yet, as seen above, the district court's order follows
thc Defendants Reply Memorandum item by item, and also fails to respond to the filed claim.
Prior courts have accepted claims of transfer as retaliation, when raised as material issues of fact

Rauso v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3rd Cir. 2001). The district court although failing to respond to the issue or
claim, does make reference to some of the retaliatory or harassing acts (R., 72-72). Yet these references are
blind acceptance of fabricated reports as being true. The court failed to even consider that these same
fabricated reports were actually events of retaliation. The issue of harassment remains in question. There is a
genuine issue as to whether Defendants actions were retaliatory in nature and therefore, summary judgment
should have been denied as a matter of law IRCP 56 (c) Because the evidence reveals that there are disputed
issues of material fact, this also is reason beyond a question of law to deny summary judgment. First Sec.

Bank ofldaho, N.A. v. M u r ~ h t 13
, 1 Idaho 787,790,964 P2d 654,657 (1998).

In the case of Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F3d 1055 (9'h Cir. 2000) the court ruled that the "loss of
a first amendment fieedom for even minimal period of time, constitutes "irreparable injury" for purpose of
entitlement to injunctive relie$ " Defendants have been attempting to separate Appellants and interfering with

their first amendment freedoms for years. When WL's parole was violated in October 2005, and he was reincarcerated, the harassment continued. Separation could not be justifiably achieved directly through P&P so

an indirect method of harassment and separation began. This harassment has been continually used to
deceptively created a derogatory file, which is now currently being used as a penological reason to not only
deny Appellants visit, but any chance of further parole as well.
The court held in Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F3d 103, 107 (2"d Cir. 1999) that when determining
whether a disciplinary sanctions is atypical and significant, the district court must review the particular
conditions of confinement to which the Appellant was subjected. It is clear, that a continuous pattern of

I
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harassment is visible. For Appellants to repeatedly be denied visiting for the same offence or to be harassed
over a past employment from twelve (12) years ago is atypical. Additionally, to have visiting privileges
"permanentlv" terminated is significant. For the district court to not address the issue or even respond to the
claim is grounds for appeal, reversal, and remand.

In the case of Allah v. Seiverling 229 F3d 220 (31d Cir. 2000) A claim was stated when prisoner, as
retaliation, was placed in ad-seg resulting in reduced access to phone calls and inadequate access to legal
research materials and assistance, ruled a denial of access to the courts. By denying visitation, Defendants
have barred Appellants from private communication in forming strategies for their court cases. It is well
settled that prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts for filing civil rights actions. This right
to access to the courts is distinct from any liberty interest in remaining free form administrative segregation or
detention.
A First Amendment claim founded on the right to access remains viable after Sandin This holding is
consistent with those of Pran v. Rowland, 65 F3d 802 806-07 (9thCir. 1995) Babcock v. White, 102 F3d
267, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995) Thaddeus X v. Blatter, 175 F3d 378, 386 (6"' Cir 1999) and Crawford-El v.

m,93 F3d 813,826 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) reversed on other grounds, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)
Appellants used visitation to develop case strategy and a plan of action for their claims. When
Defendants denied their visits, it was not to serve as a penalogical interest, but to serve as harassment for their
court cases, and to bar Appellants from having the time to develop that case strategy. Appellants went into
greater detail in the first brief on the issues that they experienced.
The 9th Cir. (1995) Ruled in Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F3d 912 the prisoner's allegations that a
correctional officer cited him for a disciplinary violation because of his prior litigation activities would violate
the equal protection clause. Any corroborating affidavits by fellow inmates to include not only testimony of
other inmates, but of other visitors, and IDOC correctional staff as well. Furthermore, by the Defendants fail

I
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to show a penalogical need for the atypical treatment. The court should have denied the Motion for Summary
Judgment and scheduled a date for trial by jury.

Defindants' Allegations on absconding to Belize
In Defendants Responding brief Pg. 3, the State alleges:

"On October 1, 2007, Warden Hurdiwn terrninuted Mrs. Lightner's
visiling privileges base on her previous arrest and unresolved criminal charges.
R., Ex. 4, at 8). The Lightners visiting privileges were also terminated bused on
William Lightner :s history o f abounding the country while on parole, along with a
variely ofpast visiting issues involving the Lightners. (Id, 8-9).
First, Appellants need to address that counsel for Defendants clearly knows he has never
addressedlargued this in district court, tile absconding to Belize as being an issue to terminate Appellants
visiting privileges. Appellant in this case, ML can contest that NEVER once was this issue mentioned to her
when her visiting was terminated on 4-12-07 or 10-07. IN FACT, during the original termination on Aprill2,
07 the only reason given to ML by Deputy Warden Christensen was issue of her arrest and nothing more.
Nothing was ever said to ML, that the reasons were for going to Belize with her husband. For Dcfendants to
now try to argue this and make it a reason of thinking in order to sway the court to believe they had a
justifiable reason to do what they did, just substantiates their wrongdoing. Since Defendants never addressed
this issue in district court this issue should not be given any consideration to courts decision. Appellants have
never had anv opvortunihl to arme this in prior pleadin~s.
Second, Appellant ML was never told by either warden during either termination that her clothes or
visiting problems were an issue. The only thing said during the visitation terminations from both IDOC
officials were targeted toward the arrest. Nothing more! If the clothes andlor other related issues or concerns
were of valid Defendants (as Mr. Kubinski points out) would have acted on them prior to the termination on
April 12, 07. This is an exaggerated response to the issues at hand and carries

I

this case.

i
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weight to the real issues of

Other visiting issues mentioned are concerning problems that Appellants have had, and dealt with by
filing formal complaints on numbers visiting guards at ISCI for harassment and retaliation. These are the
"past visiting issues" that Mr. Kubinski refers to.

Appellants have attempted on many occasions to bring

these harassment issues to officials and be treated fairly in visiting. However, when coming hack fiom
Belize, the harassinent fiom sorne visiting officers became over whelming aid hard to deal with so Appellants
filed complaints to address the negative and threatening actions, which caused even greater retaliation, to
include this April 12-07 termination.

ISSUE 4
DID THE DEPENDANTS ACTIONS VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
RULE? AND SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE MADE A
RULING ON THIS ISSUE?
A.

INTRODUCTION
On or about April 12 2007 ML's visiting was terminated. Then after writing a letter appealing the

termination to Warden Blades, he approved the request. He asked that ML keep ISCI appraised on the
changes in her case, and reinstated Appellants visiting. 'Three months, later warden Hardison took over as new
warden at ISCI replacing Blades. During the three month reinstatement, there were no new issues, concerns,
or complaints relating to their visiting. Neither had anything new in ML's case occurred to report on. She was
still waiting the pre-trial date to arrive.
When Hardison took over as warden he reversed warden Blades' decision and terminated Appellants
visiting for the same issue they had been terminated on 12 April 2007, and done so without due process.

THE ISSUE IS NOT ONLY DOUBLE JEOPARDY BUT INCLUDES THE COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL RULE AS WELL:
I

Double Jeopardy:
It is clear that Appellants made a claim of Double Jeopardy violations (R., 15 and 40). It is also a
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statement of fact that the district court failed to respond to the issue. Respondent's have claimed that "Bejbre

an appellant may assert an i , ~ . ~on
u e appeal, he must obtain and udverse ruling on that issue from the trial
court State v. Fislter, 123 Idaho 481,485, 849 P 2.d 942,946 (1993)." (Respondent's Brief p. 22)
Appellants claim that the issue demands a reply from the courts, and requests this higher court to
remand the issue back to the district court, for a finding to the complaint. It is an injustice to Appellants and
a fundamental error for the district court not to make a ruling, creating an estoppel to appeal on the
unanswered constitutional issue brought forth in the complaint.
It is further stated in Summary Judgment by Respondents that the Double Jeopardy claim is a result of
retaliation. (Respondents Brief pp 22-23) yet the Double Jeopardy claim made by Appellants is distinct and
completely separate from that of retaliation. (Appellants Brief p. 5). The Double Jeopardy claim arises from
having visits suspended and punished twice the same offence without being afforded due process. This being
a fact and matter of law demands a reply distinctly separate from that of retaliation.
The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is not related to retaliation, but provides that "no

person shall be ...subject,for the same ofknse to be twice put in,jeopardyqf'ltfi or limb". 1t is highly disputed
that the termination of Appellants visiting privileges constituted a second punishment and prosecution for the
same offense, while Respondents claim that the second punishment was "the result of a discretionary

administrative decision " (Respondents Briefp. 24) it is still a denial ofprivileges and a punishment.
As stated earlier, Appellants had an established liberty interest. To deny that established interest is
punishment. To do it twice, four months apart is a violation of Double Jeopardy, and the claim should be
granted by authority of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Collateral Estoppel Rule:
The Respondents continue to ignore the fact that Appellant Marcia Lightner (Marcia) may have been
charged with the offense of harboring a fugitive, Marcia was not convicted of the offense; and until one is
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convicted one is considered innocent and may not be punished simply for being charged. Respondent
Hardison punished Marcia for being charged with the offense and it matters not what the policies and
procedures may hold regarding this issue; it's still against the law to punish Marcia by terminating her visits
after Warden Blades whom had full knowledge of the pending charge reinstated them. Warden Blades
resolved this fact in Appellants' favor and as such, the Respondents cannot raise this fact due to the colkcterul

estoppel rule. See Dudnev v. Alameida, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29506 at [*12].

ISSUE 5
ARE DEFEDANTS ENTILED TO OUALIFIED IMMUNUTY?
OUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants are personally liable in this $1983 action if they knew or should have known that they
were violating Appellants federal rights. See, Harlow v. Fitzrerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson,

Creiakton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Appellants explain their answer to the question of whether Defendants are
entitled to claim qualified immunity.

In Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392 (9''' Cir. 1990). State officials

can only claim qualified immunity when they are engaging in discretionary acts. but here, Defendants were
required to perform specific acts in which they had no discretion. Therefore, the qualified immunity defense
is not available. In Alexander v. Perrill, for example, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider a claimed defense
of qualified immunity made by prison officials because the act they allegedly failed to perform--calculating a
prisoner's sentence-was

specifically required of them by the state law, Id. 916 F.2d 1399 11. 22. In so

holding, the court relied on its prior ruling in Johnson V, Duf&, 588 F.2d 740,743 (9IhCir. 1978):
[Ulnder 5 1983 the qualified immunity defense is inapplicable whenever an
official 'does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or
omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation [of an individual's rights].' [Citing Johnson v. Duffy.] Under 9
1983 when an official fails to take an action that he has a clearly established
duty to take and that failure is a foreseeable contributing factor to the violation
of a Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the defense is similarly unavailable.
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Alexander, 9 16 F.2d at 1 396. See also, Cooper v. Du~nik,963 F.2d 1220, 1250-51 (9"' Cir. 1992)
(en banc); Redman v. Countv o f §an Diem, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9thCir. 1991). Accordingly, Appellants
prima facie showing that defendants (who carried a position of authority has not performed these mandatory
acts sufficient to defeat her claim of qualified immunity. Alexander v. Perrill;

Johnson v. Duffy. For this

reason alone, Defendants claim of qualified immunity must be denied; as demonstrated below, there is
abundant evidence that Defendants have not performed their legal duties.
Even if we employ the standard

analysis and view Defendant's acts as discretionary, the

conclusion is the same. After all, Defendants knew (or should know) that U.S. Constitutional law supersedcs
any idealistic excuse for any person to hinder and violate another persons Fourteenth Amendment Right to
Due process, the right to be heard, created liberty interest is protected. U.S. Constitutional rights of an
inmatelparoleelor family member should always be recognized as their guaranteed right and not perceived as a
privilege that has to be earned. The IDOC officials should bc rcrninded of the importance of providing
Constitutional safegwds to ensure their actions do not infringe upon that protected right of those they are in
supervision over, or as in this case lack of professional conduct and abuse of digression and authority.
Those procedural safeguards are aimed at enhancing the reliability and quality of the fact-finding
process of decisions that play a critical part in rehabilitation. The U.S. protected Constitutional Fourteenth
Amendcd right holds and affirms that a prisoner or visitor has a sufficient interest, and due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and Idaho Constitution art. 1,

5

13. Are affirmed as well, that

unless IDOC can overcome the "Restrictions and reasonably and necessurily related to the advancement of

Tome justifiable purpose of imprisonment", Defendants have no case. For their reasoning's are not justifiably
applied to approve and reinstate visitation then deny it for the same reasons without any further incidents from
Appellants. With that being said, in Dcfendants "termination of visiting with out a hearing or prior notice, or
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right to be heard" being utilized and applied, there was no "reasonably and necessarily related lo the
advancement of some jusii$ahle purpose of impri.~onment". Meaning, that Defendants reasoning was not
necessarily related to any justifiable purpose that had anything to do with Appellants visiting suspension.
On November 14,2008 a District court hearing was held. (See transcripts pg. 9-10, line 14-19) where
Appellant WL tried to gain information from Defendants as to what Defendant Hardison was basing his
decision on for reasons of suspending our visits, that he based it on his own discretion, and that the reason for
making his decision cannot be found in a policy and procedure? Appellant WL co~itinued(on pg 10 line 1-23)
stating:

"What was your penological reasoning for suspending our visits?' And in
Defendants response to the interrogatory question was, "Pursuant to IDOCpolicy
and procedure SOP 601-02-01,001, the,facility has discretion to lerminate those
same privileges. " Appellant WL followed by stating, "So just by quoting the
number of a policy andprocedure doesn't tell what he is basing that decision on.
Facts are, there was no Penological reasoning applied to this termination. Appellant ML stated (transcripts pg.
53 -54) that:

"When warden Hardison made the decision as appellate authoriw, he was the
final decision make?;and no procedure is available,for the grievance. The policy
gives many steps@ the prison oflcial to take upon receiving any grievance, but
it does not give any steps after the warden had made his decision. So if there is
something that gives Bill the auihority or ihe right or whatever in the police or
procedure, it is not set our for anybody to review, read, qffollow through with
when the warden has ultimate control in decision power on that decision.
To continue this argument, (see transcript pg 53, line 17-25 and pg. 54 line 1-25). Appellants conclude
that when Warden Hardison called ML on October 1,2007 and told her he was suspending her visits (without
a hearing or any right to be heard prior to a suspension, after a liberty interest had been created). ML made
her appeal to him at that time and (line 21) he states "...he mentioned the policy and that his decision was

,final". The felony charge did not stick, after ML's case was completed it was misdemeanor and should have
been changed as such and visiting reinstated per IDOC Policy,
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Appellants contend that there is no way to grieve the warden after he was the final appellate authority
on the phone the day he talked to ML and suspended her visits. Defendant's argument is weak on this issue
because the warden was the last authority to grieve and he is the one that made the decision.
Defendants counsel argues that Appellants could have appealed the Wardens decision, (however ML
did and was turned down an meeting with tile director) and goes on to state that (see transcripts pg 55 Iine1525), "Pursuant to that SOI: the IDOC director is not involved in the grievance process. " If that is the case,

how can Appellants grieve someone who is not involved in the grievance process? It can not be done. It
shows that the IDOC policy on the grievance process is contradicting when the director himself does not
recognize he is a part of the grievance process, he stated in his interrogatories and responses. Defendant
Hardison called himself the appellate authority when speaking to ML, (see Tr. pg. 51 lines 1-13) and Jill
Whittington confinns this through IDOC directives.
Defendant's counsel argued (Tr. pg 40, line 15-25) states that:

"In this case, the Lightners or more specifically Mr. Lightner did not choose to
follow ihe grievance process. Hex Warden Hardison is the guy who made the
decision so I don t need to jdlow through." Well,first qf all, there is nothing in
the grievance process ...that says that you cannot grieve the warden. "
However bazaar this statement is to Appellants, the grievance process to grieve the wardens decision
that Mr. Kubinski states was available, simply was not, and he could not provide and policy and procedure
that upheld his argument eithcr. As stated above, Appellants have shown the court that there was no avenue to
grieve the Wardens decision. It must be mentioned her also that Mr. Kubinski mentions that "...more

spec~~cully
Mr Lightner did not choose to follow ... ", but Mrs. Lightner did contact the IDOC to try and meet
with Director Reinke and was refused that opportunity when Jeff Zumuta acted in his stead and stood by
Hardisons decision without offering any opportunity to bring forth her case and circumstances.
By choosing to impose direct action on Appellants by suspending their visiting privileges after they were
reinstated form warden Blades violated Appellants Rights to procedural Due Process. Defendants failed in their
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duty to perform under the law by: "when an o$icialfail.~to take an action thal he has a clearly established

duty to take and that ,failure is a foreseeable contributing factor to the violation of Appellants constitutional
rights, the defense is similar13
When the law is clear, as it is here, Defendants disobeyed that law, they did so at their peril. They
therefore should enjoy no qualified immunity. See Ward v. County of §an Diecro, 791 F.2d 1329 (9" Cir. 1986)
(When decisional law notifies jail officials that prisoners may not be strip searched in certain situations, jailer
who ignores that notice is not entitled to qualified immunity); VaueItan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736 (9" Cir.
1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1075 (1989) (when prison officials use more force on inmates than decisional law
allows, they lose qualified immunity); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321 (9" Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1075 (1989) (district court properly denied claimed immunity of prison officials who used a more
intrusive search of prisoner than decisional law allowed); DiMartini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922 (9'h Cir. 1990)
cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1 990) (officials who ignores decisional law and informs employer of alleged
I

wrongdoing by employee is not entitled to qualified immunity); Kraus E Counfv o f Pierce, 793 F. 2d 1105
(9" Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987) (police officers lose qualified immunity when they violated
clearly established rights of Plaintiff in making arrest); Felix v. McCartha 939 F2d699 (91h Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165 (1992) (prison guard is not entitled to qualified immunity when he uses more force
than permitted under decisional law); Cooper v. Duunik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9" Cir 1992) (police officers who
ignore suspect's rights under Miranda are not entitled to qualified immunity, given that the law was clearly
established at the time of Defendant's actions). In this case the Constitution of the United States should have
been recognized by Defendants. After all, it is not new by any means. Ignorance of the law should give no
favor to those who do not make themselves aware of the law. IDOC policy and procedures should have a
secured P&P to cover the rights of other. As well the Court should recognize and hold that in Owens v. Kellev

I
681 F.2d 1362, proves Appellants argument.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-32-

Supported in
violate law."&

standard it protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

at 536. To clarify, either Defendants have never read those decisions, in which case they are

plainly incompetent, or they have deliberately chosen to disobey them. Whichever is true, they are not
entitled to qualified immunity. "If Defendants have violated clearly established law, helshe will generally be
liable." Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F. 2d 1392, 1396 (9'h Cir. 1990), here, the law has been clearly established,
and Defendants are liable for any violation of that law that deprived Appellants of their constitutional right. In
this case, Defendants clearly and deliberately ignored their responsibilities as a Governmental authority and
violated Appellants of their U.S. Constitutional rights to Due process, a created liberty interest and their right
to be heard.
The burden, of course, is on the Defendants to prove that they are entitled to defense of qualified
immunity. Harlow, 4567 U.S. at 819; Houphton v. South. 965, E2d 1536 (91h Cir. 1992). In this context,
then, Defendants must show that they were faithfully complying with clearly established law. The clearly
established law that Defendants were required to obey was, U.S. Constitutional law guaranteed to protect
Appellants rights, which is the Supreme law of the land. And Defendants have the burden of showing
compliance with it.
The "proof" submitted by Defendants would be laughable if the subject were not so tragic. They
submitted no written policies and procedures that uphold a person their liberty interest due process rights are
being enforced. They submit no testimony upholding legal foundation that supersedes the Constitutional
Fourteenth Amendment right. They submit no documents proving their contention of qualified immunity.
Appellants deserved their full guaranteed right to the safeguards of due process that ensures their
constitutional rights to a hearing and notice to be heard, applying their created Liberty Interest, are fulfilled
rcgardless of Defendants personal wontedness or vendetta to suspend Appellants visiting. In Alexand~rv.

Pevrifl, 916 F 2d 1392, 1398 (9"' Cir. 1990) (court quickly cites to the fact that Defendants prison officials'
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"duties are clearly established by virtue or the Bureau of Prisons regulations and Policies which they were
legally obligated to perform.") Here, as in Alexander, we do not have to look hither and yon when the answer
is staring us in the face. The clcarly established law that Defendants were required to obey is the Fourteenth
Amendment right to U.S. Constitution, and Defendants have the burden of showing compliance with it.
ISSUE 6
DID DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSAL OF IIEFENDANT REINKE?
.AND. SIIOL'LD DEFENDANT IfARDISON REMAIN A P.4RTk' TO THE ACTION BECtiLISE HE

DIED?
A.

INTRODUCTION
In Defendants Response Brief pg. 12, argument is raised on, (1) Dismissal of Reinke in the 1983 Law

suite. (2) Whether warden Hardison is still a party to the action because he has passed away.
Appellants' argument is: (1) Appellants named Reinke, Hardison and Nelson on the Notice of appeal,
notifying the court that they are taking the position that these Defendants will be addressed in their appeal
process. (2) The fact that Warden Hardison has died is of no legal concern to this case. His successor is the
liable party to the action per Idaho Rule 25(d).
Court abused its Discretion in dismissing Defendant Reinke:

ellants ants presented their argument to the district court as to Director Reinke's responsibilities as
being the Director of the [DOC holds a position of "supervi.singliability", which is the ultimate authority, and
controlling individual that employees have to answer to. Because Defendant Reinke supervises or has taken
responsibility through his position as Director, he is liable and directly responsible for the actions of those
who work under him.

According to Idaho Rules orevidence 201, Appellants request the c o u ~take
t judicial notice on the district record, "Motion for
reconsideration, on courts disnlissal of Reinke as Defendant. Appellants have also filed a Motion for the court to take judicial
notice as well.
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Appellants argued this extensively in district court (Tr. pgs. 57-58-59) stated: "Stating a claim and--in the reply memorandum of the summary judgment, Mr. Kubinski mentions the plaintiffs failed to proffer
any evidence in the record establishing Director Reinke's participation. When in fact, ML contacted IDOC to
meet with the director and was referred to Jeff Zumuta. ML pleaded with him for an appointment with the
director and he would not set the appointment with her. Being the Chief of Prisons his position was directly
under the Director. Because of Reinke's failure to act, it caused plaintiffs' damage. Jeff Zumuta acted in
place of the Director which holds the Director responsible for not acting himself."
Policy says he (Director) is to handle grievances, yet Defendants have stated he doesn't.

Defendant

Reinke is responsible for not taking action when we tried to grieve this to him. It is called "Supervisor
liability". Same as if there was a company party and people drive home drunk from the party, if they get into
a wreck, the company is held liable for the actions of that employee, and sued..
These theories of law are supported in Watkins v. CiOI of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093, (9"' Cir
1998). A supervisors' approval of subordinate's request to commit an act that may be unconstitutional, may
cause supervisor to lose qualified immunity. Another case, TnvIor v. List, 880, F2d 1040, (9th Cir. 1998),
alleging that the supervisor failed to properly train or supervise personnel that led to the deprivation of
constitutional rights or by alleging that the defendant knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to
prevent further misconduct, states a 1983 claim. In Fiilfer v. Oakland, 47 F3d 1523 or 1528-29 (9" Cir.
1995). Court held that supervisor had an obligation to investigate allegations of lawful, unlawful conduct and
to take prompt corrective action suficient not only to end the current unlawful conduct but also to deter
further wrongful conduct. In Barm V. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 SD Cal. (1997) A supervisor may be
liable for constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in, directed, or knew of the
violation, or failed to act or prevent them, also if evidence of suffice the allegations of knowledge and failure
to act, supported by the correspondent evidence, indicating that the defendants had necessary notice.
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When ML made her appeal to IDOC and requested a meeting with Director Reinke, and was
intercepted by Jeff Zumuta, ML was informed that he would not make the appointment and was denied.
Therefore, the negligent acts of Director Reinke's staff are not sufficient when Defendant Reinke failed to act.
Because of the position he holds as Director of the IDOC, and because P&P as well as a court Order to
enforce due process was in place, he was obligated to hear Appellants appeal aid review the grievance, and he
did nothing.

Defendant Hardison sltould remain agar@to the action, regardless of his death:
In the district Court, Defendants filed a Memorandum for Summary Judgment 21 November 2008 but
did not ague the issue of Defendant Hardison passing in their issues or arguments. Yet Defendants mention it
in their Reply Brief, which Defendant Hardison died Oct. 2008. Because this was not addressed at the district
court, Defendants are barred by malting an issue of this in briefing.
In addition, Idaho Rule 25(d). Public officers-Death

or separation from office, holds: "When a public

oficer in an official capacity i,s party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or olherwi,se ceases
to hold oflce, the action shall he continued and maintarned by or against the oJficer:s successor"
Defendant Hardison has died; however, that does not (by Idaho law) relieve Defendants from their liability.
When Appellants visiting termination took place, Defendant Hardison was very much alive and a party to the
action, and he was very much involved in the final appellate authority decision making process which was
done without affording Appellants their due process hearing after their Liberty Interest was created by
Warden Blades reinstatement. Since Defendant Hardison has left his position at the prison (ISCI), the prison
did not cease to function or close down; his position was replaced by another to cany on. Idaho Rule 25(d)
give Appellants assurance that, When a public officer in an official capacity i~party to an action and during

itr pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold ofJce, the uction shall he continued and maintained bv
or anainst the officer:s successor
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Per Idaho Rule, the Court is legally obligated by law to keep Defendant

Hardison as a Defendant and a party to the action or his successor in this case. Just because he has passed
away, this gives no legal authority to remove him from this case.

ISSUE 7
ARE DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES?
PLRA and 28 USC 1915. The statute states, in part, 28 USC (b) "(4) In no event shall aprisoner he

prohibited from bringing a civil action ...for the reason that the prisoner has no u~srtsand no means by
which do pay the initialfilingfee. " The Federal Appellate and District Courts have held the "safety valve"
provision of the PLRA applied to the prisoner's initial fee and that the prisoner should be allowed to proceed
with his action. See Tavlor v. Delatoore, 281 F3d 844 (9th Cir. 2002); Norton v. Dimaznna, 122 F3d 286

(5fh Cir. 1997)(held that prisoners will have access to court regardless of their incomes); Farese v. Scherer,
342 F3d 1223 (1 lth Cir. 2003)(held that section 1915 applied only in a suit where the prisoner proceeds
without "prepayment of fees or security therefore.").

Appellant Marcia Lightner is on disability and to

burden her with the costs of Attorney's fees could very well place her in a homeless situation. Also in Smith

v. State of Idnho, Idaho S.Ct. 33254 has held and substantiated that Appellants procedural due proceeds rights
were violated.
Appellants have filed a lawsuit that has merit and due process, liberty interest claims which have
violated their constitutional due process rights to a hearing or notice prior to their visitation being terminated.
Appellants have shown this court that they have claims that can be challenged, and these claims are not of a
frivolous nature. Nor was this lawsuit filed for frivolous reasons. Appellants have paid all their court, and
appeal fees to bring forth their claims, thereby showing good cause in seeking justice where they feel justice
has failed in this case. To burden Appellants who are basically indigent and to force payment of additional
court costs and fees because Appellants filed a lawsuit on Defendants is an appealable issue for this court to
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address on appeal. Because Appellants have stated sound claims and shown Due process violations of their
right to be heard and liberty interests did in fact occurred in this case, Appellants have shown this case is not
of a frivolous nature therefore Defendants request for Attorney's fees should be denied on any outcome or
decision.

CONCLUSION
Appellants' rights were violated in that punishment was handed out without giving them a due process
hearing. They were not allowed to call witnesses, or to rebut testimony or evidence used against them.
Neither were they allowed to provide evidence in their on behalf. They were denied the basic right of
confronting their accusers. While WL does loose any of his at the prison gate, due process is not one of them.
Furthermore, offense was issued against ML, who is dot an inmate and retains all her rights.
When Appellants Consortium was denied Defendants also effectively hindered their right to access the
court. The use of mail and telephones is not only extreme expensive, but also it gives Defendants an unfair
advantage. It allows them recorded access to Appellants strategies. History records show that President
Nixon was convicted in Water Gate. How politically small does a person need to be before their rights

don't matter? And they no longer can pursue the right of happiness?
Because of the nature of WL's criminal charge, certain select IDOC officials targeted him for
harassment. Coupled with a VSP label this harassment escalated the rights violations. Married to WL, ML
has had to endure and suffer the same harassment and haltered from which hate crimes stem. This issue is not
restricted to this case alone. In the distant past, society went on which hunts trying to destroy anyone they
could place in that catcgory. In today's society it is sex offenders. The classification may be different, but the
results are the same. Those classified, as sex offenders are harassed and undergo all forms of mistreatment.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-38-

Based upon the issues brought before the court, Appellants plead to this court for a reversal in this
case. Appellants seek justice in this matter that their visiting will be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted this 2 f x y

/

of January 2010.
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